We analyze conditional optimization problems arising in discrete time Principal-Agent problems of delegated portfolio optimization. Applying tools from Conditional Analysis to the case of linear contracts we show that most results known in the literature for very specific instances of the problem carry over to translation invariant and time-consistent utility functions in very general probabilistic settings.
Introduction
In this article we analyze conditional optimization problems arising in the dynamic Principal-Agent (PA) Problem of delegated portfolio management. In these models, which belong to the class of contracting problems under moral hazard, an investor (the Principal) outsources her portfolio selection to a manager (the Agent) whose investment decisions the investor cannot or does not want to monitor.
Moral hazard problems have been first studied in [15, 16] in static environments and in [21, 20] in dynamic environments. In recent years, such problems have received renewed attention in the economics and financial mathematics literature. The seminal contribution [19] analyzed dynamic moral hazard problems in continuous time in which the output is a diffusion process with drift determined by the agent's effort. The optimal contract, based on the agent's continuation value as a state variable, was computed using sophisticated stochastic control and PDE methods. Using similar methods, [1] studied a PA model in which a risk-neutral agent with limited liability must exert unobservable effort to reduce the likelihood of large but infrequent losses. In [22] a Stochastic Maximum Principle was applied to dynamic PA models to find first order conditions for optimality. In the most general case the Stochastic Maximum Principle leads to the characterization of optimal contracts through a system of fully coupled Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations for which no general existence theory exists. These equations can typically only be solved explicitly when the analysis is confined to models driven by Brownian motion, specific preferencestypically linear, expected exponential or power utility functions -and information is symmetric, i.e. both parties observe the driving Brownian motion. We refer to the monograph [11] for a systematic survey of the mathematical literature on dynamic PA models and to [10] for a recent model of portfolio delegation under incomplete information which leads to even more complex dynamics.
Our work is motivated by [18] -which was in a sense generalized in [6] -where a delegated portfolio management problem with linear contracts in continuous time was analyzed. Under the assumption of exponential utilities the contracting problem in [18] is solved by means of a HJB approach and the optimal contract is showed to be of the form "lump-sum payment plus gains/losses with respect to a benchmark portfolio". We consider a portfolio delegation model in discrete time with linear contracts yet very general utility functions and price dynamics. Our main assumptions on preferences are timeconsistency and translation invariance. Under mild regularity and concavity conditions this entails a variational representation of preferences. With our choice of preferences, we show that the problem of dynamic contract design can be reduced to a series of one-period conditional optimization problems of risk-sharing type under constraints. To do so we employ the usual approach of viewing the Agent's continuation utility at any point in time as the Principal's decision variable, with the Principal's decisions being restricted by an incentive compatibility constraint. To the best of our knowledge this argument was first put forward in [21] and later in [20] .
Our approach of reducing the dynamic contracting problem to a series of conditional one-period problems is similar to the one employed in a model of equilibrium pricing in incomplete markets in [7] . The optimizations therein are simpler, though, as the exchange of risk takes place through linear subspaces spanned by the tradable asset which is not the case in our model. Our optimization problems can be viewed as conditional extensions of the ones analyzed in e.g. [2, 5] where the exchange of risk takes place through (conditional) L p spaces. Conditional analysis -see e.g. [14, 13, 8 ] -provides a framework to tackle conditional optimization problems, at the same time avoiding technical measurable selection arguments.
Our conditional one-period optimization problems are not convex a-priori, due to incentive compatibility constraints. However with linear contracts the Principal's and Agent's problems can be merged into unconstrained ones, whose solutions yield an optimal contract. In economic terms, the reduction to unconstrained problems means that the first-best solution is implementable under moral hazard if it exists: the contract one obtains is the same one would obtain if the Principal and Agent had the same information and had to agree to share the gains and losses from trading between themselves. This insight is not new; related results have been obtained in the literature for specific preferences. What our findings show is that this result is owed to the linear structure of contracts and the semi-linear structure of preferences and is hence robust to some degree with respect to the choice of preferences and price dynamics.
The main challenge is then to solve the unconstrained optimization problems. The approach we follow is to prove that the set of potential optimizers is bounded in a suitable sense. In the greatest generality we work in the conditional version of L 1 spaces and with conditional utility functions enjoying a certain sequential upper-semicontinuity on balls, which in particular yields variational representations in the spirit of [17] . The transit from boundedness to optimality uses a conditional variant of the usual Komlos argument.
We fully solve the PA problem for the case of Optimized Certainty Equivalent (OCE) utilities -see e.g. [3] and references therein -and bounded prices under minimal requirements. In a Markovian framework and under a certain Predictable Representation Property (PRP) our static conditional problems reduce to deterministic ones in Euclidean spaces. For such setting we find for general OCEs the optimal contract by the Lagrange multiplier method and show how one can recover the known result that the optimal contract is of the form "lump-sum payment plus gains/losses with respect to a benchmark portfolio." Our Markovian framework under PRP includes a discrete-time versions of the model in [18] as well as many of the standard dynamic risk sharing problems under symmetric information as special cases.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the modelling framework, show how the dynamic problem reduces to a sequence of static ones and present our main results along with examples (OCEs) for which these results can be applied. In Section 3 we prove general attainability results for the Agent's and Principal's problem. In Section 4 we specialize our analysis assuming Markovianity and PRP which allows us to obtain the optimal contracts explicitly. In Appendix A we survey existing and prove new conditional analysis results which we need throughout this work. Appendices B and C prove results on OCEs and one of the main results of this paper, respectively.
The model and main results
We consider a discrete time model with time grid {0, 1, ..., T } for some deterministic terminal time T < ∞. Uncertainty is modelled by a probability space (Ω, F, P). The probability space carries an N -dimensional, strictly positive, discounted stock price process P = {P t } whose filtration we denote by F = {F t }. We assume throughout that E[P t+1 |F t ] is a.s. finite.
In what follows all equalities and inequalities are to be understood in the P-a.s. sense. We put ∆P t+1 := P t+1 − P t and ∆P t+1 := diag(P t ) −1 ∆P t+1 , where diag(·) denotes the diagonal matrix associated with the vector in its argument. The same notation applies for other processes different than P . We write P 0:t to denote the path of the price process from time 0 to t and take the convention that vectors are regarded as column ones.
At each time t ∈ T := {0, 1, ..., T − 1} the Agent (he) chooses an N-dimensional F t -measurable effort level A t . These represent the funds invested in each asset. The cost associated with A t is denoted c t (A t ).
Effort levels are known only to the Agent. The wealth at time t ∈ T associated with a sequence of effort levels A = {A t } is given by:
The Principal (she) observes progressively stock prices and wealth levels and offers the Agent a contract based on her available information. A contract will consist of a linear combination of a payment contingent on the evolution of the price process and a reward depending linearly on the wealth increments. All payments are made at the closing date T . With our choice of preferences can latter assumption can be made w.l.o.g.
Preferences.
To introduce our preference functionals we denote, for a given choice of effort level A, by F A the filtration generated by the pair of processes (P, W A ). For the Agent the filtrations F and F A coincide; for the Principal they differ unless she knows the Agent's actions 1 . The respective preferences are then encoded by a family of utility functionals:
where L 0 (F T ) denotes the set of real-valued F T -measurable functions, and L 0 (F t ) the real and possibly {−∞}-valued F t -measurable functions; a similar definition applies to the filtration F A . We use the notation U a and U p when referring to the Agent's and Principal's preferences, respectively.
For a filtration {G t } and family U : 1 The fact that the Principal observes price and wealth dynamics does not necessarily mean that she can observe directly Agent's decisions. For optimal contracts the Principal will indeed know Agent's decision as functions of prices. This is not true "off equilibrium", though. Hence we need to distinguish Agent's and Principal's information at this point.
for all t ∈ T. We shall refer to these axioms as the usual conditions and denote by dom(U t ) := {X ∈ L 0 (G T ) : U t (X) ∈ L 0 (G t )} the domain of U t . It is well-known (see [7] or [14] ) that the usual conditions imply the tower property stating that U t (X) = U t (U t+1 (X)) whenever X ∈ dom(U t+1 ), as well as the local property stating that 1 A U t (X) = 1 A U t (Y ) whenever X, Y ∈ L 0 (G T ), A ∈ G t and 1 A X = 1 A Y . We refer to [7] for a detailed discussion of the usual conditions along with their implications for utility optimization and equilibrium pricing. The following are basic examples where they are satisfied.
again denotedŨ t , is well defined between L(G t+1 ) and L(G t ). It is not difficult to see that the pasting U t (X) :=Ũ t •Ũ t+1 • · · · •Ũ T (X) forms a time consistent and translation invariant family. Example 2.3 (Optimized Certainty Equivalents). Both the well-known risk neutral family X → E(X|G t ) and the entropic family X → − 1 γ log (E(exp(−γX)|G t )) satisfy the usual assumptions (pasting together as in the previous example). More generally, the family
satisfies these properties as well, provided H is a convex, closed and increasing function with the property H * (1) := sup s [s − H(s)] = 0. The latter family of functionals is called Optimized Certainty Equivalent ; see [3] . In [7] and the references therein it is shown that optimized certainty equivalents satisfy the pasting property of the previous example. Let us introduce some notation and terminology which will be repeatedly used. Given two sigma-algebras G ⊂G let us define the conditional L 1 spaces
For p < ∞ the L p variant thereof is evident and we remark that L 1 G (G) = L 0 (G)L 1 (G) as sets. Call also
We refer to Appendix A for a background on these notions. An important regularity assumption on the preference functions which we shall consider is L 0 − L 1 upper semicontinuity.
We are now ready to state our standing assumption which we shall assume to hold throughout. Assumption 2.5. Let U stand for U a or U p and G for F or F A respectively. Then U satisfies the usual conditions with respect to G. Moreover, U t is L 0 − L 1 upper semicontinuous for each t and
Our notion of semicontinuity entails a variational representation of preferences. The next result will be part of Proposition A.9 below.
Proposition 2.6. Under Assumption 2.5 the following variational representations hold:
where
are the conjugates of the utility functionals U p t and U a t respectively and
Example 2.7. In Lemma B.1 we shall prove that the entropic family
the Tail-value-at-risk family, defined for each λ ∈ (0, 1) as
and more generally optimized certainty equivalents for which 1 ∈ int(dom(H * )) fulfil Assumption 2.5 when restricted to L 1 Gt (G T ). As we shall further see in Remark 4.5, under our Predictable Representation Property actually any Optimized Certainty Equivalent satisfies Assumption 2.5.
Contracts.
The simplest contracts the Principal may offer the Agent consist of a fixed F T -measurable (lump-side) payment Θ which we may interpret as a financial derivative contingent only on the path of the price process, plus a constant β times the closing value of the portfolio W A T . Such contracts (or more exactly, menus of payments) take the form:
Because the Principal observes the whole wealth process progressively, we shall actually consider a wider family of contracts of the form:
where β t ∈ L 0 (F t ) and Θ is as before, which make better use of her available information. Let us however emphasize that unless the market consists of only one asset, the Agent's actions remain unobservable since the most that can be inferred form P and W A are the affine linear spaces where A must have evolved; see (1) . However, as in [18] , we shall find that an optimal incentive-compatible contract is indeed of the form S. This is a consequence of our implicit assumption that the Principal does not seek to infer/learn anything about A from observing P and W A , which we may justify as it being too expensive or time-consuming for the Principal.
We will conveniently refer to a contract as S, (Θ, β) or (Θ, {β t }) depending on the context and denote by R ∈ R the Agent's reservation utility, i.e. the least utility the Agent demands in order to commit to a contract
is individually rational if the optimal utility the Agent can obtain at time 0 from it is at least R.
In the sequel we show how to obtain recursive representations of the Agent's and the Principal's utilities and how to reduce the problem of optimal dynamic contract design to a sequence of static problems.
2.2.1. Agent's problem. Let us assume that the Agent chooses an effort level A when presented with a contract S(·). His total cost of effort is then C(A) := T −1 t=0 c t (A t ) and his utility seen from time t is U a t (S(A) − C(A)). Using translation invariance we compute:
This shows that the Agent's optimization problem of finding the best effort level A given a contract S(·) reduces to the following recursion:
where we omit for simplicity the dependence of H in S. Thus H t has the interpretation of being the maximal utility the Agent can get, from time t onwards. Since adding an F t −measurable term to Θ translates additively into H t and preserves optimality of effort levels, we see that the individual rationality condition binds (H 0 = R) for any contract that is optimal for the Principal.
2.2.2.
Principal's problem. The Principal's problem is to design an optimal incentive compatible and individually rational contract. To the end, suppose again that the Agent has chosen A when presented with a contract S(·), and that the Principal knows this. Her utility seen from time t is then:
where the identity Θ = H t + s≥t ∆H s+1 and translation invariance was used. If we denote by h t (A, β) her utility from future income, then time consistency along with translation invariance yields:
Performing the change of variables
and writing h t (A, Γ) instead of h t (A, β) we arrive at:
If (Θ, {β t }) is incentive compatible, then unique optimal effort levels for the Agent exist, due to our concavity assumptions on his utility and cost function. For every time t ∈ T we may thus construct the random variable Γ t+1 , and A t will attain the essential supremum:
We say that ({A}, {Γ}) is incentive compatible whenever for every t this A t attains this supremum. In terms of the set
In particular, we can introduce the following recursion for the Principal's future optimal wealth:
Remark 2.10. We just arrived at the well-known result that in constructing an optimal contract the Principal should consider the Agent's continuation utility as a decision variable of hers. This also resolves the issue of information asymmetry: assuming that the Principal knows the mappings A t as functions of {P s } s≤t for each t implies that all the random variables in (6) and (8) become price-adapted. If optimal efforts are not unique, then one has to specify which effort levels {A t } (the Principal recommends) the Agent implements in order to carry out the above recursion. This is why in the PA literature one often calls such effort levels recommended effort levels and the triple (Θ, {β t }, {A t }) incentive compatible.
Main results.
In this section we summarize the main results of our paper. We start with the following theorem which makes our formal derivations of the Agent's and Principal's optimal wealth precise. Its proof is given in Appendix C.
Theorem 2.11. Assume that the recursions (5) and (9) admit a solution with the essential suprema attained at each time t. Then the Principal's optimal utility at time t = 0 equals W 0 − R + h 0 . Further, calling (β t , A t , Γ t+1 ) t∈T the maximizers attaining h in (9), and defining
} is the optimal contract for the Principal, among those satisfying incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. The associated optimal effort for the Agent is A and his optimal wealth will be R.
We now define an auxiliary unconstrained version of the optimization problem in (9) , and prove that if such a problem is well-posed, it yields a solution to the original one-step problem, and the corresponding β t = 1 is optimal. The importance of this result is that we may dispense with the non-convex sets C t .
Proposition 2.12. Assume that the following problem is finite and attainable:
Then any maximizer Â ,Γ belongs to the set C t (1) and therefore
Proof. Let (Â,Γ) be a maximizer for (10) . For arbitrary A, define Γ =Γ + (A −Â)∆P . Plugging in that (Â,Γ) is better than (A, Γ) for (10), we see that the terms involving U p cancel out and so:
. This means that Â ,Γ ∈ C t (1) so the values of the constrained and unconstrained problems coincide.
Remark 2.13. The previous proof crucially relies on the fact that contracts are assumed linear. Indeed by varyingΓ in directions of the form (A −Â)∆P and by linearity of contracts the term in the objective function involving Principal's utility cancel out, making it possible to compare the values of Agent's utilities.
In Section 3 we shall turn our attention to the question of attainability of the unconstrained problems introduced above. For the reader's convenience we state in this section our main results therein and show how they apply to specific classes of examples. The proof of the following result is given in Section 3.2.
Theorem 2.14. Suppose that Assumption 2.5 holds and that further
and this problem has an optimal solution. In particular β t = 1 is optimal at time t ∈ T
It is well known that if the utility functionals originate from a common base functional more explicit treatments of equilibrium/risk-sharing problems become available (as in [2, 5] ). In the same spirit we have the following result. Its proof is given in Section 3.2.
Theorem 2.15 (Base Preferences). Suppose that there exists non-negative numbers γ a , γ p and base preference functionals {U t } such that
Further assume that
Then Principal's one-step problem (at time t) has as solution:
for any optimal action A * of the Agent, which attains:
In light of Theorem 2.11 the two previous result yield a solution to the dynamic problem, as explained in the following proposition. The proof is obvious.
Proposition 2.16. If the assumptions of Theorem 2.14 or Theorem 2.15 hold for every t ∈ T, then the respective one-step problems have a solution and pasting them together yields a solution for the respective dynamic problems and β t = 1 for every t ∈ T is optimal. In particular for such optimal contract the Agent keeps the output wealth and the Principal is given a possibly path-dependent derivative
The following theorem shows that the assumptions in Proposition 2.16 are satisfied for a class of OCE utilities when prices are bounded. The proof is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 2.17. Suppose that prices are bounded (0 < p − ≤ P i t ≤ p + a.s.) and that both U a and U p are constructed by pasting of optimized certainty equivalent functionals:
whereby the condition 1 ∈ int(dom(H a t ))∩int(dom(H p t )) holds for each t. Suppose also that lim |a|→∞ ct(a) |a| = ∞ for every t. Then our dynamic Principal-Agent problem has a solution whereby the Agent keeps the output wealth and the Principal is given a possibly path-dependent derivative.
A family of examples where we can provide explicitly the form of an optimal contract, recovering the results of [18] in the continuous case is given in Section 4.1 below. It requires additional notation, though, so we postpone the statement of the result to Section 4.
General attainability results
We prove in this section the attainability of the Agent's and Principal's one-step problems, and consequently, for the dynamic problem.
Agent's Problem.
We start with an abstract conditional optimization problem of which the Agent's one-step optimization problems are special cases. For a given pair of random variables (X, β) ∈ L 0 (F t+1 ) × L 0 (F t ), let G(t, X, β) := ess sup
Under the usual conditions g t is F t −concave, and hence stable (see Definition A.4). The key to the above optimization problem is to reduce it to an L 0 (F t )−bounded set. Lemma 3.1. Under the following condition, the essential supremum in (12) is attained:
Proof. We intend to apply Theorem A.6. Evidently ess sup
The set Λ is L 0 −convex, contains the origin and is σ−stable. That Λ is sequentially closed is an application of Proposition A.9.
For A ∈ [L 0 (F t )] N not identically null we use the variational representation of U a established in Proposition 2.6 to bound:
where Z ∈ W t . Using that A, β are F t -measurable and Cauchy-Schwarz applied pointwise, we bound from above the sum of the last two terms in (13) on the set where A does not vanish by:
Since Z ∈ L ∞ Ft (F t+1 ) and |E[∆P |F t ]| is a.s. finite by assumption, we see that the majorizing term tends to −∞ on a non-negligible set as n → ∞ and so does g t (nA). Since g t (0) = U a t (X) − c t (0) > −∞ by assumption, we get a contradiction, and so Theorem A.3 shows that Λ is L 0 (F t )-bounded. Hence Theorem A.6 applies to ess sup A∈Λ g t (A), since the mapping A → g t (A) is L 0 -upper semicontinuous by Proposition A.9. This establishes attainability.
The following is an immediate corollary of the previous lemma. (5), is attained.
Principal's Problem.
In this section we prove Theorem 2.14, which sharpens Proposition 2.12. The Principal's problem at time t consists in maximizing
Recall from Remark 2.10 that the Principal's preference functionals U p t may and will be considered as mappings from L 0 (F T ) to L 0 (F t ), satisfying the usual assumptions w.r.t. F. Thus we have that V t (A, Γ) ∈ L 0 (F t ) and hence we may assume w.l.o.g. that E[Γ|F t ] = 0 when maximizing V . In a first step, we will show that the set
(e.g.Z = 1) and using the variational representation of the preference functionals:
Since S A is σ-stable, we can use Lemma A.5 to conclude. Indeed, if S A were not L 0 (F t )-bounded, then there exists a non-negligible setΩ and a sequence {A n } ⊂ S A such that |A n | ≥ n onΩ. Similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 3.1 would establish V (0, 0) = −∞ on a non-negligible set, contradicting our hypotheses. Thus S A must be L 0 (F t )-bounded.
Next, we prove that the set
Ft (F T ). Let us chose ǫ ∈ L 0 (F t ) ∩ (0, 1] as in the statement of this theorem, fix Γ ∈ S Γ and define
Moreover, E[Z a |F t ] = E[Z p |F t ] = 1, implying that Z a,p ∈ W t and thus α p (Z p ) ≤ K p and α a (Z a ) ≤ K a . We hence obtain that
for some N ∈ L 0 (F t ) where the latter inequality follows by assumption and the fact that the effort levels had already been proven to be L 0 (F t )-bounded. Therefore for (A, Γ) ∈ S we have
for someK ∈ L 0 (F t ). This implies that S Γ is bounded in L 1
Ft (F T ) as ǫ > 0 a.s. Next, we notice that there exists a sequence (A n ,
thanks to the terms in V being F t −stable and ξ ∈ F t . Applying Lemma A.7 iteratively (component-wise for the A n 's and then to the Γ n 's, see the discussion around the mentioned lemma), we find non-negative real numbers {λ n i } with i≥n λ n i = 1, and random variables Γ * ∈ L 0 (F t+1 ) and A * ∈ L 0 (F t ) N such that Γ n = i≥n λ n i Γ i → Γ * andÃ n = i≥n λ n i A i → A * a.s. Also (Ã n ,Γ n ) ∈ S by convexity. Moreover,
since (a.s.) convergent sequences of real numbers remain converging under convex combinations of its tails and V is concave.
By Proposition A.9 V (·, ·) is L 0 -upper semicontinuous in the first variable, and since S Γ is conditional L 1 bounded, also L 0 -upper semicontinuous in the second variable restricted to S Γ . We thus get that Σ ≤ V (A * , Γ * ) and hence we have equality. This shows that Σ < ∞ since the preference functionals are proper. Finally, by Proposition 2.12 we conclude that β = 1 is optimal and Principal's one-step problem is attained. ✷
We proceed now to the proof of Theorem 2.15.
Proof of Theorem 2.15. Let us first fix an effort level A and put x := h + A∆P t+1 andγ := γ a γ p γ a +γ p . Concavity of the preference functional yields:
On the other hand, taking Γ * = γ p γ a +γ p x it follows that 1
. Therefore this Γ * attains the essential supremum above. Thus the Principal's problem reduces to: (14) ess sup
If this problem is attained at A * , then the previous argument shows that Γ * = γ p γ a +γ p (h t+1 + A * ∆P t+1 ) is optimal. The problem (14) is of the same form as that analyzed in Lemma 3.1, simply replacing U a by 1 γ U t (γ·), calling X = h and taking β = 1. In particular, we obtain existence of an optimizer A * . Because the one-step unconstrained problem is attained, Proposition 2.12 shows that taking β = 1, A * and Γ * at time t yields an optimal one-step decision. ✷ Remark 3.3. In this article we chose to work in the biggest conditional (loc. convex) space of L p -type, this is, the conditional L 1 space. The reason is twofold. On the one hand, had we worked with smaller subspaces, we would have had in principle more tools at hand to prove the attainability of Principal's one-step problems, however we chose not to limit the scope of utility functionals a priori, in terms of their domains, for which the theory would be applicable to. On the other hand, even acknowledging the fact that our L 0 − L 1 upper semicontinuity requirement is not a mild one, the alternative would have been to impose from the outset some sort of "sup-compactness" of our functionals (more precisely, of their convolutions) or again to work with smaller spaces than conditional L 1 ; ideally conditionally reflexive ones. It seems to us that our simple sequential (and rather point-wise) L 0 − L 1 upper semicontinuity has the advantage of being a more tractable and less technical requirement than the other, very valid, ones.
Optimal contracting under predictable representation
Up to now our probability space and price process were rather general. In this section we add more structure to the problem in order to obtain more explicit solutions. In particular we fix a volatility matrix σ ∈ R N,d with linearly independent rows (d ≥ N ), assume that the flow of information is generated by a d-dimensional processw = (w 1 , ..., w d ) whose evolution is observed by both parties and that the price dynamics follows:
Moreover, we shall work under the following "Predictable Representation Property" and assume that our utility functionals satisfy a Markov condition.
Assumption 4.1. The Predictable Representation Property (PRP) holds: for some D ∈ N ∪ {0} there exists processes w d+1 , ..., w D adapted to the filtration {F t } generated by the processw such that the extended process w = (w 1 , ...,w d , w d+1 , ..., w D ) has uncorrelated increments which are independent of the past, have zero mean and non-trivial finite second moments and
We stress that if initially the d-dimensionalw process driving the price had not enjoyed the PRP, then Assumption 4.1 simply says that we can complete the former process in such a way that the enlarged process does enjoy the PRP, without changing the informational structure of the model. The following example clarifies our PRP assumption. . . , T } starting at 0, such that P(∆w i t = √ h) = P(∆w i t = − √ h) = 1 2 . They do not necessarily have the Predictable Representation Property, unless d = 1. Yet, as shown in the appendix of [7] for D = 2 d − 1, there exists an adapted family w d+1 , · · · , w D of likewise distributed random walks, such that the whole extended family w 1 , . . . , w D has increments uncorrelated to each other and independent from the past, and enjoys the Predictable Representation Property.
We further restrict ourselves to preference functionals which satisfy the following Markov Property. 
are Markovian in the sense that g a , g p map R D to R.
If a preference functional U satisfies the usual conditions and the PRP holds, then all the relevant information of U t is summarized by its generator. Clearly g t inherits from U t being null at the origin and concave. In the case that P may only take a finite number of values, and by the "local property," A, γ) , which is all we need. As a consequence, the results of the previous section extend to e.g. every optimized certainty equivalent utility in the PRP case. We spare the reader the repetitive work of proving the above points, and instead proceed to a more explicit characterization of optimal contracts.
From the substitution Γ t+1 −E[Γ t+1 |F t+1 ] = γ·∆w t+1 for some γ ∈ [L 0 (F t )] D valid by the PRP assumption, we may call a tuple (A, β, γ) without danger of confusion a contract (we shall always work with these variables under the PRP). Principal's recursion (9) and the incentive compatibility set C t (β) may then be re-defined in terms of such tuple in an obvious way.
Remark 4.6. From equation (9) it becomes apparent that under the PRP and Markovianity Assumptions h t becomes a real number for all t. Indeed, everything in the one-step optimization problems (the g's and c's) is non-random when evaluated at non-random inputs, from which it suffices to consider (A, β, γ) ∈ R N × R × R D and maximize point-wise. This of course shows that in this case if there is an optimal contract, then the optimal (A, β, γ) is non-random.
4.1.
Computing optimal contract and necessary optimality conditions.
Starting from the original formulation (9), we tackle the attainability issue without resorting immediately to the unconstrained variant. We will thus see that in fact solving this unconstrained problem is not only sufficient but necessary in a sense. Furthermore, in our present framework we will be able to write down explicitly the optimal contract. We first derive the First Order Conditions (FOC) for Agent's and Principal's one-step problems:
Lemma 4.7. Assume that g p t is once and g a t , c t are twice continuously differentiable, for t ∈ T. Then:
Moreover, given an optimal contract {(A t , β t , γ t )} for the Principal, and supposing for every time t ∈ T that the implied one-step contracts form a regular point for the corresponding constraints appearing in the r.h.s. of (17) : this is, the matrices µ + σ∇g a t (γ t ) | β t σ∇ 2 g a t (γ t ) | − ∇ 2 c t (A t ) ∈ R N ×(1+D+N ) have full range, there exists Lagrange multipliers λ t ∈ R N s.t. the following systems admit a solution:
Proof. We omit the time index for simplicity. The identity (17) follows by differentiation and noticing that the optimization problem in C t (β) is concave in the A variable. It is also easy to see that the matrix
has as rows the gradients of the components of βµ − ∇c t (A) + βσ∇g a t (γ). By e.g. [4, Chapter 3] we thus have the existence of a Lagrange multiplier λ. Forming the Lagrangian
and taking the partial derivatives w.r.t. λ, A, γ, β yields the desired system. Therefore, as soon as one searches for a β > 0 and either c or g a are respectively strictly convex or concave, then necessarily λ = 0. This shows that a reasonable optimal solution to the problems must necessarily solve also the "unconstrained" problem with FOC:
We knew from previous sections, in greater generality, that solving the unconstrained problem is sufficient to construct a solution to the original constrained one. Hence these last equations show that, in the present context at least, passing through the unconstrained formulation is actually also necessary, at least for contracts with β > 0.
Subtracting the second from the first equation above and then using the third one, we get:
(β − 1)[µ + σ∇g a (γ)] = 0.
Thus either β = 1 is optimal, or µ + σ∇g a (γ) = 0. This last case can be called a degenerate case, since under it we derive from (18) that it is optimal for the Agent to exercise minimum effort: ∇c(A) = 0.
Since necessary conditions give a larger set of potential optimal points than the actual set of optima, we are inclined to say that this degenerate case is never optimal at all.
Conclusion
The present article clarifies the structure of optimal linear contracts in dynamic models of portfolio delegation when both parties' preferences satisfy translation invariance, time consistency and certain regularity conditions. We have shown how the problem of dynamic contracting can be reduced to a recursive sequence of one-period conditional optimization problems. Using conditional analysis techniques we established general attainability results for the Agent and Principal problems and derived explicit representation of optimal contracts under a Markov and PRP assumption. Several questions are still open. First, the restriction to linear contracts is undesirable. Unfortunately, our method does in no obvious way carry over to non-linear contracts. Second, in the PRP framework we assumed that the Principal observes the driving processw. Although this assumption seems common in the literature, it would be more natural to assume that the Principal observes the price increments only. This would add an additional adverse selection component to our model, if one interprets the Agent's additional information as his type, and hence leading to very complex optimization problems. Finally, it would be interesting to analyze portfolio delegation models under limited liability. If one restricts oneself a-priori to a particular class of pay-off profiles such as call options, then our methods can probably still be used to establish existence of optimal contracts (within the pre-specified class). It is an open questions how to analyze models of limited liability without any such a-priori restriction.
Appendix A. Conditional Analysis
This appendix recalls conditional analysis results needed to analyze our dynamic contracting problem. We also establish new results which are key to our PA problem. For a detailed discussion of finite dimensional conditional analysis we refer to [8] and references therein; for a thorough treatment of conditional analysis on L p spaces we refer to [14] .
A.1. Finite dimensional conditional analysis. On a given probability space (Ω, F, P) we denote by L and L 0 the sets of all, respectively all a.s. finite random variables. We apply almost-sure identification and ordering on this sets and put L := {X ∈ L : X > −∞} and L := {X ∈ L : X < ∞} and denote by N(F) the set of variables in L 0 which take values in N. We fix N ∈ N and view E := [L 0 (F)] N as a finite-dimensional topological L 0 (F)-module over the ring L 0 (F). On E we define the conditional norm X = (X · X) 1 2 (notice that this is a random variable), where the product is the euclidean one.
Definition A.1. A set C ⊂ E is called: A stable and sequentially closed set is σ−stable. We define for M ∈ N(F) and (X n ) ⊂ E the element X M = n∈N 1 M =n X n ∈ E and notice that if the former sequence belongs to a σ−stable set, then the latter does so too. The following result is a generalization of the classical Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem.
Then there exists X ∈ E and a sequence (N n ) ∈ N(F) such that N n+1 > N n and X = lim n→∞ X Nn a.s. Also, if (x n ) ⊂ L 0 is such that x := lim sup x n ∈ L 0 , then there exists a sequence (N n ) ∈ N(F) such that N n+1 > N n and x = lim n→∞ x Nn a.s.
Proof. For the first statement refer to [8, Theorem 3.8] . For the second, define N 0 = 0 and N n = min{m > N n−1 : x m ≥ x − 1/n}. Then N n ∈ N(F) and N n+1 > N n , from which N n ≥ n follows. Now, notice that sup m≥n x m ≥ sup m≥Nn x m ≥ x Nn ≥ x − 1/n a.s., from which x = lim n→∞ x Nn a.s.
As in the euclidean case, convexity opens the way to a necessary and sufficient characterization of boundedness (see [8, Theorem 3.13] ):
Theorem A.3. Let C be a sequentially closed L 0 −convex subset of E which contains 0. Then C is L 0 −bounded if and only if for any X ∈ C\{0} there exists a k ∈ N such that kX / ∈ C.
Let us now introduce the notions of continuity, convexity and stability of functions defined on subsets of E and taking values in a set of random variables.
Definition A.4. Let C ⊂ E. A function f : C → L is called:
For the last two items it is assumed that C is L 0 −convex, respectively, stable. Strict L 0 −convexity is defined in terms of a strict inequality. Finally f is called (upper/lower semi)continuous on C if it is so on every point of C. If f is continuous and stable over a σ−stable and sequentially closed set, then it satisfies the stability property for countable partitions too. If f is L 0 −convex or L 0 −concave, then it is
, which in itself directly implies that it also satisfies the stability property for countable partitions.
The following result is implied by the proof of [8, Theorem 4.13] , since all the authors really use is σ−stability of the set under consideration (which is implied by their stronger assumptions). We give a self-contained proof here.
Lemma A.5. If a non-empty set C ⊂ E is σ−stable and is not L 0 −bounded, then there is a setΩ with P(Ω) > 0 and a sequence {X n } ⊂ C such that, for every n ∈ N, |X n | ≥ n overΩ Proof. We define U n := {B ∈ F : ∃X ∈ C, |X| ≥ n on B}, which is non-empty since C is unbounded, introduce the family of decreasing sets A n := ess sup B∈Un 1 B = 1 and put A := n A n . Assuming that P(A) = 0, or equivalently that P (∪ n A c n ) = 1, then for every X ∈ C:
Since X ∈ C was arbitrary, this implies that C is L 0 (F)−bounded. Therefore P(A) > 0 must hold. By definition of ess sup we have that there exist {B l,n } l ∈ U n such that ess sup B∈Un 1 B = sup l 1 B l,n a.s. This implies A n = l B l,n a.s. Taking X l,n such that |X l,n | ≥ n on B l,n , and fixing an X * ∈ C arbitrary, let us define:
which belongs to C thanks to σ−stability. Clearly
and therefore a.s. |1 A X (n) | ≥ n1 A . Thus we have that |X (n) | ≥ n on A for every n.
The following conditional optimization theorem is used to prove attainability of the Agent Problem. For a proof we refer to [8, Theorem 4.4] .
Theorem A.6. Let C be a sequentially closed and stable subset of E and f : C → L be a L 0 −lower semicontinuous, stable function. Assume there exists an X 0 ∈ C such that the set {X ∈ C : f (X) ≤ f (X 0 )} is L 0 −bounded. Then there exists anX ∈ C such that f X = ess inf X∈C f (X).
If f and C are L 0 −convex then the "arg min" set is also L 0 −convex, and if in addition f is strictly L 0 −convex thenX is the sole (a.s.) optimizer.
We finally establish Komlos-type result for conditionally bounded random variables which we use to prove our general attainability result (Theorem 2.14). It is a slight extension of [12, Lemma A1.1].
Lemma A.7. Let {ξ n } n be [0, +∞)-valued random variables defined on a common probability space (Ω, G, P), take F a sub-sigma algebra and assume that the set C := conv{ξ n : n ∈ N} satisfies the following conditional boundedness condition:
Then there exists a [0, +∞)-valued random variable X and a sequence {x n }, where x n belongs to the convex hull of {ξ n , ξ n+1 , . . . } such that x n → X almost surely.
Proof. Following the proof in [12, Lemma A1.1], the sequence {x n } with the desired convergence is obtained. It remains to be shown that its limit X is a.s. finite. For this, notice that by conditional Fatou's lemma P(X ≥ a|F) ≤ lim inf P(x n ≥ a|F), for every a ∈ L 0 (F). Therefore, fixing ǫ ∈ L 0 + (F) the existence of a ∈ L 0 (F) such that P(x n ≥ a|F) ≤ ǫ shows that P(X ≥ a|F) ≤ ǫ. On the other hand, P(X = ∞|F) ≤ P(X ≥ a|F) ≤ ǫ. Since ǫ was arbitrary this shows that P(X = ∞|F) = 0 a.s. and therefore P(X = ∞) = 0.
A.2. Conditional analysis on L p . Let F be a sub sigma-algebra of G. For every p ∈ [1, +∞] we define:
This is well defined for every X ∈ L 0 (G). We further define the conditional L p -space
It is shown in [14] that L p F (G) is a topological L 0 (F)−module over the topological ring L 0 (F), and || · || p is an L 0 (F)−norm inducing the module topology on L p F (G). A function U : L p F (G) → L 0 is called: 
Then U satisfies the following variational representation:
In the next Proposition we prove that L p F (G)−upper semicontinuity is a consequence of L 0 − L p upper semicontinuity (see Definition 2.4 ). This of course implies Proposition 2.6. Proposition A.9. Let U : L p F (G) → L 0 (F) be L 0 −L p upper semicontinuous. Then U is also L p F (G)−upper semicontinuous. Furthermore, if U is also proper, monotone, translation invariant and L 0 (F)-concave, then U admits a variational representation and for any N ∈ N and ∆ ∈ [L p F (G)] N the functional
is L 0 -upper semicontinuous in the sense of Definition A.4.
Proof. By [13, Lemma 3.10], it is enough to prove that the sets K k := {X ∈ L p F (G) : U (X) ≥ k} are conditionally closed for every k ∈ L 0 (F) in order to prove the first assertion. We will prove that their complements are conditionally open. To this end we fix such a k and and assume to the contrary that (K k ) c is not open. We thus take X such that U (X) < k on a non-negligible set and such that for every N ∈ N(F) we have that K k ∩ B(X, 1/N ) = ∅, where B(X, 1/N ) = {Z : E(|Z − X| p |F) ≤ 1/N }. This means that we can find, for every N ∈ N(F), an element X N ∈ B(X, 1/N ) such that U (X N ) ≥ k a.s. A straightforward adaptation of Markov's inequality yields
for every ǫ ∈ L 0 (F) ++ . From this we may find for every natural number n an element M n ∈ N(F) such that:
• for every N ∈ N(F) st. N ≥ M n it holds that P(|X N − X| ≥ 1/n|F) ≤ 1/n 2 a.s.
• for every n: M n+1 > M n a.s. Now, we will use a "Borel-Cantelli Lemma"-type reasoning in order to prove that the sequence {X Mn } converges almost surely to X. First notice that for a fixed l ∈ N: Since this holds for every l, we conclude that indeed {X Mn } converges almost surely to X.
Finally we have by the L 0 − L p upper semicontinuity assumption that k ≤ lim sup n U (X Mn ) ≤ U (X) a.s. since by definition X Mn ∈ B(X, 1), but also U (X) < k on a non-negligible set, which is a contradiction. This completes the proof of the first statement.
By Theorem A.8 and the first claim we know that U has a variational representation. For the last claim it thus suffices to prove that for each Z ∈ L q F (G), where q is conjugate to p, the functional
is L 0 (F)-upper semicontinuous. This is trivial, since E[ZA · ∆|F] = A · E[Z∆|F]. . In any case we see that 1 ∈ int(dom(H * )) holds. It thus suffices to prove the lemma under the last condition.
Let us take X n bounded in L 1 F (G) such that X n → X a.s. For any C ∈ L 0 (F) we want to show that if ess sup s {s − E(H(s − X n )|F)} ≥ C then also ess sup s {s − E(H(s − X)|F)} ≥ C. Indeed, let us first take s n ∈ L 0 (F) such that s n − E(H(s n − X n )|F) ≥ C − n −1 .
Because H is convex, lower-semicontinuous and proper, we have that H(s n − E(X n |F)) ≥ R[s n − E(X n |F)] − H * (R) for each R, and so in particular s n [1 − R] ≥ C − n −1 − H * (R) − RE(X n |F), for every R ∈ dom(H * ). If we were able to find R ∈ dom(H * ) ∩ (1, ∞) then for such element we would have
Similarly, if r ∈ dom(H * ) ∩ (−∞, 1) existed then we would get s n ≥ C − n −1 − H * (r) − rE(X n |F) 1 − r .
Altogether, we could conclude that the quantities s n are L 0 (F)-bounded, since the random variables X n were bounded in L 1 F (G). By Lemma A.2 we could find N n ∈ N(F) increasing to +∞ such that s Nn →s a.s. for somes ∈ L 0 (F), and obviously X Nn → X a.s. still. By locality we would have that s Nn − E(H(s Nn − X Nn )|F) ≥ C − N n −1 .
Taking lim sup n , using the fact that H is bounded below by an affine function and conditional Fatou's Lemma, we may obtains − E(H(s − X)|F) ≥ C.
This readily implies what we wanted to prove. Finally, the conditions dom(H * )∩(1, ∞) = ∅ and dom(H * )∩ (−∞, 1) = ∅ are together equivalent to 1 ∈ int(dom(H * )) in our case, since 1 ∈ dom(H * ) by definition and H * is convex. That Assumption 2.5 holds is now trivial. equation for t + 1, . . . , T − 1, and H t+1 was attained say at (â t+1 , . . . ,â T −1 ). This implies that:
H t ≤ ess sup at −c(a t ) + U a t H t+1 (â t+1 , . . . ,â T −1 ) + β t a t ∆P t+1
≤ ess sup at,...,a T −1 −c(a t ) + U a t H t+1 (a t+1 , . . . , a T −1 ) + β t a t ∆P t+1 = ess sup At,...,A T −1 H t (A t , . . . , A T −1 ) =: H t .
So indeed at time t also H t = ess sup at −c(a t ) + U a t H t+1 + β t a t ∆P t+1 holds and by assumption the last term is attained at someâ t , from which H t is attained at (â t , . . . ,â T −1 ). This closes the inductive step, and therefore the desired recursion holds. Now we will establish rigorously recursion (8) (equivalently (6)). To this end we denote by β = (β t ) t a generic decision variable for the Principal and a = (a t ) t where a t ∈ L 0 (F t ) N , a corresponding optimal effort for the Agent. Let
Then using the just proven expression for H t (i.e. (5)), and setting Γ = β t a t ∆P t+1 + H t+1 , we get:
We proceed now to prove that a solution to Principal's recursion delivers indeed an optimal (dynamic) contract, and that the Agent behaves as predicted. Call (β t , A t , Γ t+1 ) t the optimal quantities attaining h in (9) . Define Θ and the contract S as in the statement of the present theorem. Then:
By definition of C(β) the sum of the last terms is smaller or equal than 0, and exactly zero when a T −1 = A T −1 . Therefore ess sup
This shows that at time T − 1 the Agent chooses A T −1 when presented with (Θ, β). If we define H T = Θ, we are thus entitled to call H T the value (left hand side or right one) in the above equality. By using backwards induction, as we have often done and hence omit, we have proven that the contract S (defined from (Θ, β)) is optimal for the Principal and incentive compatible (notice that automatically H 0 = R), and the Agent indeed chooses A under this contract. ✷
